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ABSTRACT 
Many bioscience firms collaborate with public research 
universities to conduct innovative research through sponsored 
research agreements.  Companies sponsoring this research usually 
require strict confidentiality from their academic partners in order 
to protect sensitive information that, if revealed, could put them at 
a competitive disadvantage and threaten their ability to obtain 
future patents.  Yet, ambiguous disclosure requirements in the 
California Public Records Act preclude California’s public 
research universities from guaranteeing that proprietary 
information provided in connection with sponsored research 
agreements will remain confidential.  Entering into such 
agreements with public universities in California is therefore a 
risky proposition for the sponsors.  This iBrief argues that unless 
this is corrected, many of these public/private partnerships, which 
often lead to significant advances in science and medicine, may be 
deterred. 
INTRODUCTION 
¶1 Competition among the states for a share of the burgeoning 
bioscience industry is fierce.3  While the San Francisco Bay Area, Boston, 
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3 The terms “biotechnology” and “bioscience” are related and often used 
interchangeably, but understanding the distinction between the two is important.  
The biosciences are a “range of industry sectors relying on insights into the way 
living organisms function.”  BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY ORGANIZATION, 
LABORATORIES OF INNOVATION: STATE BIOSCIENCE INITIATIVES 2004 5 (2004), 
available at http://www.bio.org/local/battelle2004/main_report.pdf [hereinafter 
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New Jersey, the Baltimore/Washington, DC region, North Carolina’s 
Research Triangle, and San Diego have traditionally been “the nation’s 
premier bioscience centers,” their dominant positions are no longer secure.4   
In 2001, fourteen states had “identified the biosciences as an economic 
development opportunity.”5  By 2004, forty states had targeted the 
biosciences for development.6   
¶2 Nevertheless, California is still the national leader in bioscience 
research and development.  In 2002, California was home to 410 
biotechnology firms, representing 30% of the U.S. market.7  Massachusetts 
came in second with 210.8  California is also home to 23% of Americans 
involved in cutting-edge research and testing.9  This is far more than its 
closest competitors, Illinois and Massachusetts, which respectively host 
only 8.6% and 6.9% of these researchers.10  However, a hole in California’s 
public records laws may be hampering the state’s ability to take full 
advantage of this intellectual capital.   
¶3 In order to succeed, bioscience companies require (1) strong 
academic research institutions conducting basic research in the biosciences, 
(2) access to public and private early-stage capital, (3) the ability to turn 
government funded research into successful commercial products, (4) 
specialized research facilities, (5) a “highly skilled workforce,” and (6) a 
                                                                                                                       
LABORATORIES OF INNOVATION].  These sectors include agriculture livestock 
and chemicals, drugs and pharmaceuticals, medical devices and equipment, 
research and testing, and academic health centers, hospitals and research 
institutes.  Id.  Biotechnology, on the other hand, refers to “the application of 
molecular and cellular processes to solve problems, conduct research, and create 
goods and services.”  Id.  Hence, “biosciences” refers to a group of industries all 
engaged in the life sciences, while “biotechnology” is a classification of 
products produced by certain subsectors of the general bioscience industry.   
4 See id. at 23; Clint Riley, N.J. Must Fend Off Research Rivals, 
NORTHJERSEY.COM, June 21, 2005, 
http://www.northjersey.com/page.php?qstr=eXJpcnk3ZjczN2Y3dnFlZUVFeXk
3MDImZmdiZWw3Zjd2cWVlRUV5eTY3MTA3MzMmeXJpcnk3ZjcxN2Y3dn
FlZUVFeXky; Boston, San Francisco Bay Area and Greater Philadelphia Are 
Top Life Sciences Clusters in the U.S., New Milken Institute Study Shows, 
BUSINESS WIRE, June 20, 2005, http://www.businesswire.com. 
5 LABORATORIES OF INNOVATION, supra note 3, at vii. 
6 Id. at 28-29. 
7 OCCUPATIONAL RESEARCH UNIT, CALIFORNIA EMPLOYMENT DEVELOPMENT 
DEPARTMENT, UNDER THE MICROSCOPE: BIOTECHNOLOGY JOBS IN CALIFORNIA 
17 (2004), available at http://www.calmis.cahwnet.gov/file/occmisc/Biotech-
Part1.pdf.   
8 Id. 
9 LABORATORIES OF INNOVATION, supra note 3, at 20. 
10 Id. 
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“stable and supportive public policy structure.”11  States have adopted a 
wide range of public policy strategies designed to cultivate these six 
ingredients.  Some of the most common examples include tax incentives, 
grants, public/private partnerships, and direct investment in corporate 
research parks and public research universities.  Another important, yet 
little-known, policy tool is ensuring that bioscience firms can partner with 
government entities, particularly public research universities, without 
fearing that sensitive research and development information will be made 
public.   
¶4 The ability of a public university to protect such information is 
particularly important in the context of sponsored research agreements 
(“SRAs”), where private corporations with a need for outside expertise, 
resources, or technologies fund research projects at large research 
universities.12  In a typical SRA, the corporate sponsor reveals confidential 
and proprietary information to university researchers as necessary to 
facilitate the sponsored research.  For example, a pharmaceutical company 
might disclose a proprietary drug target or candidate to enable university 
researchers to generate data useful in the development process.  For the 
sponsor, the risk of entering into these agreements is that public disclosure 
of such information would undercut substantial investments by the sponsor 
and place the sponsor at a competitive disadvantage.  Early disclosure may 
also prevent a research corporation from obtaining a patent on the disclosed 
target, candidate or method.13  Consequently, SRAs usually contain strict 
confidentiality clauses restricting the disclosure of sponsor information and 
research results. 
                                                     
11 INT’L BUS. DEV. SECTION, CANADIAN EMBASSY, BIOTECHNOLOGY MARKET 
STUDY FOR THE MID-ATLANTIC STATES (2002), http://atn-
riae.agr.ca/us/3729_e.htm. 
12 It is difficult to determine precisely how much research at California’s public 
universities is funded by outside companies through SRAs, but the available 
data indicates that it is a substantial amount.  For instance, industry-sponsored 
research funding at UC-Berkeley alone totaled over $26 million in FY 2005.  
Berkeley Campus Research Funding Reports, 
http://coeus.spo.berkeley.edu/guest_report.asp (last visited October 12, 2005).  
For FY 2001, the University of California reported that private businesses, 
particularly “pharmaceuticals and other research-intensive industries,” provided 
“$235 million, or about 40 percent of private research funds to UC.”  
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA OFFICE OF RESEARCH, FISCAL YEAR 2001 
RESEARCH FUNDING AT UC 1, available at 
http://www.ucop.edu/research/publications/pdf/resfund01.pdf. 
13 An inventor may be denied a patent if the invention was described in a printed 
publication or otherwise used more than one year prior to filing the patent 
application.  35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000).  Once a patent application is filed, it 
becomes public knowledge and the need for secrecy disappears.   
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¶5 Of course, secrecy is often contrary to the interests of university 
researchers, who want to advance science and benefit from these 
partnerships, as well.  To this end, SRAs often permit academic researchers 
to publish the results of the sponsored research after any patent applications 
have been filed and the sponsor has had the opportunity to redact its own 
confidential corporate information.14  Thus, the market has developed an 
approach to these partnerships that balances the universities’ need to 
disseminate knowledge and advance science with the sponsors’ need to 
protect sensitive corporate information. 
¶6 This iBrief examines the extent to which the California Public 
Records Act15 (“CPRA”) undercuts this compromise by precluding 
California’s public research universities from agreeing to keep trade secrets 
and other proprietary information confidential in the context of SRAs.  
Analysis will show that CPRA is one of the most lopsided public records 
laws in the country in terms of balancing the public’s “right to know” with 
the need to protect confidential corporate information.  The case-by-case 
evaluation that agencies must engage in when responding to CPRA requests 
effectively prevents California’s public universities from agreeing to 
confidentiality clauses providing adequate protection of sponsor 
information and research results.  Accordingly, under current law, counsel 
for the sponsors should consider advising their clients not to enter such 
agreements with California’s public universities where the risks of the 
potential disclosure of its sensitive information outweigh the benefits of the 
research.  In order to reduce or eliminate this deterrent on potentially 
fruitful public/private partnerships, California should amend CPRA to 
provide adequate protection for corporate proprietary information disclosed 
in connection with SRAs. 
I. THE CALIFORNIA PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 
¶7 CPRA was enacted in 1968 against a “background of legislative 
impatience with secrecy in government.”16  Largely modeled on the federal 
                                                     
14 For instance, the University of California’s contracting guidelines state that 
while “[f]reedom to publish and disseminate results is a major criterion of the 
appropriateness of any research project[,] . . . [a] sponsor may seek a short delay 
. . . in order to comment upon and to review publications for disclosure of its 
proprietary data or for potentially patentable inventions.”  UNIVERSITY OF 
CALIFORNIA OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, GUIDELINES ON UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRY 
RELATIONS (May 1989), available at 
http://www.ucop.edu/raohome/cgmemos/89-20.html. 
15 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 6250 et seq. (Deering 2005). 
16 State Bd. of Equalization v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 342, 346 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1992) (citing San Gabriel Tribune v. Superior Court, 192 Cal. Rptr. 
415, 420 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983)). 
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Freedom of Information Act,17 CPRA was the culmination of the California 
legislature’s long-running effort to “formulate a workable means of 
minimizing secrecy in government” while securing individual privacy.18  In 
fulfilling this purpose, CPRA embodies a broad policy of disclosure while 
also exempting certain classes of documents from its requirements.  This 
section will discuss CPRA’s general provisions and the specific exemptions 
that may be relevant to protecting proprietary information disclosed in 
connection with SRAs.  
 A. General Provisions 
¶8 In its introductory provision, CPRA declares that “access to 
information concerning the conduct of the people’s business is a 
fundamental and necessary right of every person in this state.”19  Under 
CPRA, “[p]ublic records are open to inspection at all times during the office 
hours of the . . . agency and every person has a right to inspect any public 
record, except as hereafter provided,” and to receive “an exact copy of an 
identifiable record unless [it is] “impracticable to do so.”20  The agency 
always bears the burden of justifying nondisclosure, and “any reasonably 
segregable portion . . . shall be available for inspection . . . after deletion of 
the portions which are exempt” from disclosure.21 
¶9 CPRA applies to all state and local agencies, including: (1) any 
officer, bureau, or department; (2) any “board, commission or agency” 
created by an agency (including advisory boards); and (3) nonprofit entities 
that are legislative bodies of a local agency.22  Public colleges and 
universities are also subject to CPRA’s requirements.23 
¶10 Once a request is received, an agency has 10 days to determine 
whether the request seeks disclosable records.24  This may be extended no 
more than 14 days in “unusual circumstances.”25  If the agency determines 
                                                     
17 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000). 
18 San Gabriel Tribune, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 420. 
19 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 6250. 
20 Id. § 6253(a), (b). 
21 Id. § 6253(a). 
22 Id. § 6252(a), (b). 
23 See generally Cal. State Univ. v. Superior Court, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 870 (Cal 
Ct. App. 2001) (applying CPRA to California State University’s private 
foundation).  See also Caitlin M. Scully, Note, Autonomy and Accountability: 
The University of California and the State Constitution, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 927, 
928 (1987) (describing how, as a public university, the University of California 
has autonomy over its exclusively internal affairs, but “is not free to deviate 
from statewide policies and laws governing such matters”). 
24 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 6253(c). 
25 Id. 
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the records cannot be disclosed, the requestor must be told the name and 
position of each person responsible for the denial.26  If the records are 
disclosable, the agency must take reasonable steps to assist the requestor in 
obtaining and copying the records.  Requestors may bring an action in state 
superior court to compel disclosure of records that are improperly 
withheld.27     
¶11 CPRA broadly defines “public record”, encompassing “any writing 
containing information relating to the conduct of the public's business 
prepared, owned, used, or retained by any state or local agency regardless of 
physical form or characteristics.”28  Since the operations of California’s 
public universities, including research, are the “public’s business” by virtue 
of being conducted at “a public facility on land owned by a public 
university,” records relating to sponsored research are likely to be deemed 
“public records” unless they fall under a specific exemption.29   
 B.   Exemptions 
¶12 CPRA exempts certain records, in whole or in part, from its 
disclosure requirements.  Qualifying for an exemption does not mean a 
record is not public, nor does it mean that disclosure is prohibited.  Rather, 
an agency may withhold or disclose exempted records at its discretion.30  
The original owner of the information has no private right of action to 
compel an agency to withhold a record once the agency decides disclosure 
is appropriate.  Moreover, whether a record is exempt is determined on a 
case-by-case basis and courts have refused to rule on whether records are 
exempt in advance of a specific request.31  
¶13 CPRA’s exemption provisions are numerous and specific.  In 
general, CPRA exempts an agency’s preliminary drafts and memoranda, 
records pertaining to litigation, private personal information, law 
enforcement information, records that are privileged under state or federal 
law, and records withheld in the public interest.32  CPRA contains no 
                                                     
26 Id. § 6253(d). 
27 Id. § 6258. 
28 Id. § 6252(e). 
29 See Cal. State Univ. v. Superior Court, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 870, 880 (Cal Ct. 
App. 2001) (holding that California State University’s private foundation’s 
records were “public records” under CPRA). 
30 See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 6253(e) (An agency “may adopt requirements for 
itself that allow for faster, more efficient, or greater access to records than 
prescribed by the minimum standards set forth in this chapter.”). 
31 See Filarsky v. Superior Court, 49 P.3d 194, 200-01 (Cal. 2002) (holding that 
CPRA does not permit courts to grant declaratory judgments regarding the status 
of a specific record prior to an actual request for disclosure). 
32 See generally CAL. GOV’T CODE § 6254. 
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specific exemption for academic or scientific research.  Accordingly, since 
SRAs do not relate to litigation, private personal information, or law 
enforcement, only the privileged information and public interest exemptions 
could possibly apply to records pertaining to these agreements.33 
¶14 Privileged and confidential information is protected from disclosure 
under CPRA by reference to the California Evidence Code’s protection of 
privileged information.34  Under the “official information privilege,” 
records are protected if they are (1) acquired in confidence and not 
previously shared with the public, and (2) disclosure is either (a) protected 
or privileged under state or federal law, or (b) against the public interest.35  
Presuming that information provided to public research universities by their 
private research partners was acquired in confidence and not previously 
revealed to the public, then the ability to keep proprietary information in 
SRAs confidential turns on whether the information is protected by state or 
federal law or is against the public interest.   
 1.  Privileged Information: Trade Secrets 
¶15 One possible basis for protecting confidential information provided 
to the University is through the California Evidence Code’s privilege for 
trade secrets.  Section 1060 of the Evidence Code provides that “the owner 
of a trade secret has a privilege to refuse to disclose the secret, and to 
prevent another from disclosing it, if the allowance of the privilege will not 
tend to conceal fraud or otherwise work injustice.”36  California law defines 
a “trade secret” as  
information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, 
device, method, technique, or process, that: (1) [d]erives independent 
economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to 
the public or to other persons who can obtain economic value from its 
                                                     
33 CPRA does, however, specifically exempt financial information given to 
regulatory bodies, commercial information used for utility system development, 
market reports, crop reports, and information used to calculate emissions data.  
Id. §§ 6254(d), 6254(e) and 6254.7. 
34 CPRA § 6254 states: 
Except as provided in Section 6254.7 and 6254.13, nothing in this 
chapter shall be construed to require disclosure of records that are . . . : 
(k) Records, the disclosure of which is exempted or prohibited pursuant 
to federal or state law, including, but not limited to, provisions of the 
Evidence Code relating to privilege. 
Id. 
35 CAL. EVID. CODE § 1040(a), (b) (Deering 2005). 
36 Id. § 1060. 
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disclosure or use; and (2) [i]s the subject of efforts that are reasonable 
under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.37
¶16 The leading case applying Section 1060 to CPRA is Uribe v. 
Howie.38  Uribe concerned a request by a professor of entomology at the 
University of California at Berkeley for pest control spray reports from a 
county Agricultural Commissioner containing confidential information 
about the chemical compounds used by pesticide applicators.39  The 
California Court of Appeals held that the data contained in the reports were 
not trade secrets because the information was available to some individuals 
outside the pesticide application business, such as doctors, insurance 
adjusters, and growers, and the applicators had not “invested any great 
amount of time, money, or expertise above and beyond that common to the 
industry to develop the pesticide mixes and the dosage levels.”40 
¶17 Although each case is evaluated independently, it is likely that 
proprietary information provided in conjunction with an SRA (e.g. a drug 
target or drug development candidate) would be considered a trade secret 
under Section 1060 and Uribe.  Unlike the spray reports, such proprietary 
information is usually not available to others outside the company, and the 
information represents a significant investment of resources.  Nevertheless, 
the analysis does not end here, for Section 1060’s protection of trade secrets 
is conditional.  Even when records contain trade secrets, courts must still 
evaluate whether disclosing the information is in the public’s interest.41  It 
is here that the privileged information analysis melds with the second prong 
of the Section 1040 test, which inquires whether records should be withheld 
in the pubic interest.   
 2.  Public Interest in Nondisclosure 
¶18 Two CPRA exemptions provide for the withholding of information 
when there is a public interest in nondisclosure.  First, in addition to a 
record containing trade secrets, the official information privilege allows an 
                                                     
37 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1(d)(1), (2) (West Supp. 2005).  
38 96 Cal. Rptr. 493 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971).   
39 Id. at 495-96. 
40 Id. at 502.  Subsequent to Uribe, California enacted the Uniform Trade 
Secrets Act.  However, the Trade Secrets Act “does not affect the disclosure of a 
record by a state or local agency under the California Public Records Act” and 
determinations as to whether disclosures of trade secrets are required “shall be 
made pursuant to the law in effect before the operative date” of the Trade 
Secrets Act.  CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.7(c). 
41 See, e.g., State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Low, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 574, 
585-86 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001), aff’d, State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. 
Garamendi, 88 P.3d 71 (Cal. 2004) (finding public interest in disclosure even 
though records might have contained trade secrets); Uribe, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 503. 
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agency to withhold a record if disclosure would be “against the public 
interest.”42  Second, Section 6255 of CPRA provides a “catchall” 
exemption permitting an agency to “justify withholding any record by 
demonstrating . . . that on the facts of the particular case the public interest 
served by not disclosing the record clearly outweighs the public interest 
served by disclosure of the record.”43  Courts apply the same balancing test 
to both exemptions.44  Accordingly, they will be addressed interchangeably 
here. 
¶19 Disclosure is against the public interest when “there is a necessity 
for preserving the confidentiality of the information that outweighs the 
necessity for disclosure in the interest of justice.”45  In construing the public 
interest, courts are guided by “a policy generally favoring disclosure of 
public records” and narrow construction of the statutory exceptions.46   
¶20 In the leading case finding a public interest in nondisclosure, Times 
Mirror Co. v. Superior Court, the California Supreme Court held that a 
request for five years’ worth of information from the governor’s 
appointment calendars was barred by Section 6255 because such massive 
scrutiny would interfere with the governor’s decision-making process.47  
The court’s conclusion was influenced by CPRA’s protection of 
“preliminary drafts, notes, or interagency or intra-agency memoranda” that 
are part of an agency’s deliberative process.48  
¶21 On the other hand, courts often find that the public interest in 
disclosure outweighs the public interest in nondisclosure when disclosing 
the information will avoid the development of “secret law” or allow the 
public to ensure that its resources are used effectively.49  For instance, in 
San Gabriel Tribune v. Superior Court, the court rejected the city’s 
argument that a waste disposal contractor’s private financial statements 
                                                     
42 CAL. EVID. CODE § 1040(b)(2) (Deering 2005). 
43 CAL. GOV. CODE  § 6255(a) (Deering 2005). 
44 See, e.g., Cal. State Univ. v. Superior Court, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 870, 885 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2001) (citing CBS, Inc. v. Block, 230 Cal. Rptr. 362, 368-69 (Cal. 
1986)). 
45 CAL. EVID. CODE § 1040(b)(2). 
46 State Farm, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 587. 
47 813 P.2d 240, 252-53 (Cal. 1991). 
48 See id. at 248-53 (discussing § 6255 in conjunction with § 6254(a)). 
49 See, e.g., State Bd. of Equalization v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 342, 
346-47 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (public interest in discouraging development of 
secret law by taxing agency outweighs agency’s interest in avoiding burden of 
extensive redaction of records); New York Times Co. v. Superior Court, 268 
Cal. Rptr. 21, 25-26 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (disclosing users of excess water 
resources ensures individuals do not receive special privileges and are not 
subject to discriminatory treatment). 
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used to evaluate a city-approved rate increase should be withheld because 
disclosure would have “a chilling effect on obtaining information in similar 
future transactions.”50  The court reasoned that this argument “mistat[ed] 
what the public’s interest is as serving the privacy interests of a private 
contractor, rather than in serving the public’s interest in participating in 
local government.”51  Accordingly, this exemption did not justify 
withholding the financial records.    
¶22 More recently, the California Court of Appeals in State Farm 
Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Low rejected an insurance company’s claim 
that records revealing where it sells insurance policies should be withheld 
because “a competitor with access to its [records] could use this information 
to target its customers in a regional marketing strategy.”52  Although 
conceding that some of the records contained trade secrets, the court 
concluded that because the insurance industry has historically deprived 
racial minorities and other disadvantaged groups of access to affordable 
insurance, public disclosure of the information “will unquestionably serve 
the public interest by illuminating the debate over these practices and 
clarifying the scope of the problem.”53 
¶23 Applying similar reasoning to public universities, the California 
Court of Appeals in California State University v. Superior Court ordered 
the university to release the names of anonymous donors who received 
license agreements for luxury suites in the university’s sports arena in 
exchange for their contributions.54  The court reasoned that because the 
arena utilized public funds on land owned by a public university, the 
“public should be able to determine whether the purchase price for luxury 
accommodations in the arena is a fair and reasonable return on its 
contribution to the project” and whether “any favoritism or advantage has 
been afforded certain individuals or entities in connection with the license 
agreements.”55 
¶24 While we are aware of no case evaluating SRAs or other similar 
agreements, the nondisclosure of proprietary information provided in 
connection with SRAs is supported by arguments that are distinguishable 
from those rejected in the cases where such disclosure was required under 
CPRA.  Public universities are not elected governments, so the public 
probably has less interest in participating in their routine affairs.  Unlike the 
insurance industry, public universities do not have a history of widespread 
                                                     
50 192 Cal. Rptr. 415, 424 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983). 
51 Id. 
52 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 574, 587 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001), aff’d, State Farm Mut. Auto. 
Ins. Co. v. Garamendi, 88 P.3d 71 (Cal. 2004).  
53 Id. at 586. 
54 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 870, 873 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001). 
55 Id. at 886. 
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discriminatory practices requiring heightened public scrutiny.  Finally, 
should proprietary information be disclosed, California’s public universities 
could potentially lose millions of dollars in research funding that would go 
to private universities or to other states more willing to protect the 
information. 
¶25 Nevertheless, the overall tenor of the cases dealing with trade 
secrets and public interest exemptions indicates that it is still uncertain 
whether a public university would be able to withhold much of the 
information relating to an SRA.  California State recognized a strong public 
interest in monitoring the activities of publicly funded universities.  
Moreover, while public research universities in California do not share the 
insurance industry’s history of discrimination, accusations of improper 
conflicts of interest between faculty and private industry could nonetheless 
lend credence to arguments favoring public scrutiny of confidential 
university matters.56   
¶26 Thus, although it is possible if not probable that proprietary 
information given to public universities in the context of an SRA will 
remain private, universities are in no position to guarantee confidentiality to 
a prospective research partner.  Recognizing this, in a published response to 
the frequently asked question “How can I assure collaborators that the 
information I gain through my research will be held in confidence?,” 
counsel for the University of California concedes that “[y]ou cannot provide 
100% assurances of confidentiality, because you can never be certain that a 
court will not require you to produce records pursuant to the Public Records 
Act.”57   
¶27 As a result, confidentiality clauses with public universities in 
California typically contain an exclusion from the university’s obligation to 
maintain the confidentiality of the sponsor’s confidential information where 
such disclosure is required by CPRA.  For example, in a publicly available 
2002 agreement between Nanosys, Inc. and University of California (UC), 
Berkeley:  
                                                     
56 See Clint Riley, Secrecy Shrouds Taxpayer-Supported Research; Industry’s 




VFRXl5Mg (documenting controversy surrounding confidential research 
agreements and conflicts of interest at New Jersey’s public research 
universities). 
57 MARIA SHANLE, UNIVERSITY COUNSEL, INFORMATION PRACTICES – 
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 2 (2002), available at 
http://ucce.ucdavis.edu/files/filelibrary/5220/19937.pdf. 
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Neither party may disclose the terms of this Agreement to a third party 
without express written permission of the other party, except when 
required under either the California Public Records Act or other 
applicable law or court order.58
¶28 The lack of predictability reflected in this example makes 
disclosing sensitive information to public research universities a risky 
proposition for the disclosing party.  Even if one of California’s public 
universities wanted to protect confidential records, what information 
California courts would require to be disclosed is unclear.  This uncertainty 
may hamper the ability of academic and bioscience industry researchers to 
collaborate on mutually beneficial research projects.   
¶29 The impediments of CPRA’s ambiguous disclosure requirements 
are not unknown to California lawmakers.  Recently, California’s public 
pension funds were excluded from investing in certain private equity 
investment funds “due to the risk of disclosure of information [the private 
funds] consider confidential and proprietary but that they provide to the 
public institutional investors in the course of doing business.”59  This 
prompted the California legislature to pass legislation exempting this 
information from disclosure and to provide “guidance on what is and what 
is not disclosable under [CPRA].”60  The remainder of this iBrief will 
explore how CPRA could be similarly amended to provide certainty to 
bioscience firms entering into SRAs with public research universities.    
II. COMPARISON WITH SIMILAR STATE AND FEDERAL LAWS 
¶30 Drafters of public records laws have all wrestled with achieving an 
appropriate balance between protecting proprietary information and the 
public’s interest in transparency.  Nevertheless, CPRA’s failure to protect 
confidential research information is unique among comparable “right-to-
know” laws.  This saddles California’s public universities with a significant 
disadvantage in the national competition to attract bioscience research 
dollars.  To illustrate how this is so and provide insights into how CPRA 
could be amended, we will compare CPRA to its federal counterpart, the 
Freedom of Information Act and the public records law of New Jersey, 
which is one of California’s largest competitors in bioscience research.   
                                                     
58 License Agreement for Nanocrystal Technology Between Nanosys, Inc. and 
The Regents of the University of California through the Ernest Orlando 
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory § 14.2 (Oct. 2002), available at 
http://contracts.onecle.com/nanosys/uc.lic.2002.11.09.shtml.   
59 CAL. ASSEMB. COMM. ON GOV’T ORGANIZATION, ANALYSIS OF S.B. 439 4 
(June 21, 2005), available at http://www.legislature.ca.gov/cgi-bin/port-
postquery?bill_number=sb_439&sess=CUR&house=B&author=simitian.  
60 Id. at 5.  See  S.B. 439, 2005-2006 Sess. (Cal. 2005) (as passed by the State 
Senate on May 31, 2005 and the State Assembly on August 25, 2005). 
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 A. Federal Freedom of Information Act 
¶31 CPRA was largely modeled on the federal Freedom of Information 
Act (“FOIA”).61  FOIA’s “legislative history and judicial construction . . . 
thus serve to illuminate the interpretation of its California counterpart.”62  
Nevertheless, there are substantial differences in how FOIA and CPRA each 
treat confidential and proprietary information.  Most importantly, the FOIA 
exhibits much more concern for private interests in confidentiality in 
determining whether records may be withheld than does CPRA.  To 
illustrate these differences, this section will look at FOIA’s exemption for 
trade secrets and confidential information and then examine the disclosure 
policies adopted by federal agencies pursuant to this exemption. 
 1. FOIA Exemption 4 
¶32 FOIA Exemption 4 protects “trade secrets and commercial or 
financial information obtained from a person and privileged or 
confidential.”63  Two types of documents fall under this exemption: “(1) 
trade secrets, and (2) information which is (a) commercial or financial, (b) 
obtained from a person, and (c) privileged or confidential.”64  The definition 
of trade secrets mirrors that used by California courts.65  Information is 
privileged and confidential if disclosure is likely “(1) to impair the 
government’s ability to obtain necessary information in the future; or (2) to 
cause substantial harm to the competitive position of the person from whom 
the information was obtained.”66  Some circuits have adopted a more 
lenient standard for voluntarily submitted information, finding this 
information to be confidential so long as it “would customarily not be 
                                                     
61 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000). 
62 Times Mirror Co. v. Superior Court, 813 P.2d 240, 247 (Cal. 1991) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
63 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4). 
64 Lawrence Kaplan, Annotation, What Constitutes “Trade Secrets and 
Commercial or Financial Information Obtained from Person and Privileged or 
Confidential,” Exempt from Disclosure under Freedom of Information Act, 139 
A.L.R. FED. 225, 244 (rev. 2004). 
65 See id. at 276. 
66 Id. at 254.  See, e.g., Lion Raisins, Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of Agric., 354 F.3d 1072, 
1081 (9th Cir. 2004) (permitting the withholding of raisin handler’s line check 
sheets and sampling information under competitive position prong because 
disclosure would reveal to competitors in bidding competition the type and 
volume of raisins produced at a particular time); Orion Research, Inc. v. E.P.A., 
615 F.2d 551, 554 (1st Cir. 1980) (permitting the withholding of technical 
information contained in proposals submitted in connection with a government 
contract under impairment prong because disclosure would “induce potential 
bidders to submit proposals that do not include novel ideas”). 
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released to the public by the person from whom it was obtained.”67  In those 
circuits, the two-pronged test is used only when the provider was obligated 
to provide the information.68  
¶33 Unlike in California, no balancing of the public interest is required 
once a federal court analyzing a FOIA request determines that information 
is either a trade secret or confidential.  As the U.S. Supreme Court noted in 
FBI v. Abramson, “Congress thus created a scheme of categorical exclusion; 
it did not invite a judicial weighing of the benefits and evils of disclosure on 
a case-by-case basis.”69  This makes revealing sensitive information to the 
federal government much less risky for the disclosing party than to 
California state agencies. 
  2. Agency FOIA Compliance 
¶34 FOIA requires federal agencies to adopt their own policies for 
compliance with its disclosure requirements.  A number of agencies that 
regularly deal with sensitive corporate information have adopted subject-
matter specific regulations protecting this information from disclosure.  The 
University of California’s CPRA disclosure policy merely restates CPRA’s 
general exemptions without providing further clarification.70  The SEC, by 
contrast, states that it will not “[d]isclose trade secrets and commercial or 
financial information obtained from a person and privileged or 
confidential.”71  Careful to remove any uncertainty from the process, the 
SEC regulations go on to specify precisely which corporate documents are 
protected from disclosure.72 
                                                     
67 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. N.A.S.A., 180 F.3d 303, 304 (D.C. Cir. 
1999) (quoting Critical Mass Energy Project v. Nuclear Reg. Comm’n, 975 F.2d 
871, 879 (D.C. Cir. 1992)).   
68 Kaplan, supra note 64, at 265; Critical Mass, 975 F.2d at 879. 
69 Kaplan, supra note 64, at 279 (quoting F.B.I. v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 631 
(1982)). 
70 See generally UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA BUSINESS AND FINANCE 
BULLETINS, RMP-8, LEGAL REQUIREMENTS ON PRIVACY OF AND ACCESS TO 
INFORMATION (July 1, 1992), available at 
http://www.ucop.edu/ucophome/policies/bfb/rmp8.html.  
71 17 C.F.R. § 200.80(b)(4) (2005). 
72 The regulation applies to: 
(i) Information contained in letters of comment in connection with 
registration statements, applications for registration or other material filed 
with the Commission, replies thereto, and related material which is 
deemed to have been submitted to the Commission in confidence or to be 
confidential at the instance of the registrant or person who has filed such 
material unless the contrary clearly appears; and  
2005 DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW No. 23 
¶35 The FTC likewise expands upon FOIA’s general trade secrets and 
confidential information exemption. Its FOIA regulations specify that 
pursuant to Exemption 4 the FTC will not disclose “competitively sensitive 
information, such as costs or various types of sales statistics and 
inventories;” nor will it disclose “trade secrets in the nature of formulas, 
patterns, devices, and processes of manufacture, as well as names of 
customers in which there is a proprietary or highly competitive interest.”73 
¶36 Just as the federal court jurisprudence interpreting Exemption 4 
provides parties with a certain level of predictability in knowing what 
information might be disclosed, so do the SEC and FTC FOIA regulations.  
The FOIA regime thus provides corporations who disclose confidential 
information to the federal government a level of security and stability that 
California universities cannot currently hope to match under CPRA. 
 B. New Jersey’s Open Public Records Act 
¶37 In addition to the federal government, many states have included in 
their open records laws exemptions for trade secrets and confidential 
information.  Unlike California, at least twenty states have provisions that 
specifically relate to academic, scientific or technical research.74 New 
Jersey, which is one of California’s leading competitors in attracting 
bioscience research, has several particularly strong exemptions covering 
academic and life sciences research.75  Comparing the treatment of 
confidential research information in New Jersey’s Open Public Records Act 
(“OPRA”)76 with CPRA shows just how weak California’s protection is. 
                                                                                                                       
(ii) Information contained in any document submitted to or required to be 
filed with the Commission where the Commission has undertaken 
formally or informally to receive such submission or filing for its use or 
the use of specified persons only . . . ; and  
(iii) Information contained in reports, summaries, analyses, letters, or 
memoranda arising out of, in anticipation of or in connection with an 
examination or inspection of the books and records of any person or any 
other investigation.  
Id. 
73 16 C.F.R. § 4.10(a)(2) (2005). 
74 See Tammy L. Lewis & Lisa A. Vincler, Storming the Ivory Tower: The 
Competing Interests of the Public’s Right to Know and Protecting the Integrity 
of University Research, 20 J.C. & U.L. 417, 455-60 (1994) (surveying the 
confidentiality clauses in state open records laws).  
75 For example, California and New Jersey each “account for 13% of total 
employment in the drugs and pharmaceutical” industry.  LABORATORIES OF 
INNOVATION, supra note 3, at 13. 
76 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 47:1A-1 et seq. (West 2003). 
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¶38 OPRA’s overall policy of making all government records public 
and accessible upon request is similar to that of CPRA.  Yet, while CPRA’s 
protection of trade secrets and other confidential information is conditional 
at best, OPRA contains a number of virtually airtight exemptions for 
confidential research information and trade secrets.   
¶39 Similar to CPRA, OPRA contains general exemptions for “trade 
secrets and proprietary commercial or financial information obtained from 
any source” and “information which, if disclosed, would give an advantage 
to competitors or bidders.”77  However, OPRA also has a specific 
“biotechnology exemption” providing that a “public agency shall not make 
any biotechnology trade secrets and related confidential information it has 
access to under this act available to any other public agency, or to the 
general public, except as allowed pursuant to federal law.”78  Additionally, 
OPRA includes a comprehensive exemption for academic research, which 
states: 
A government record shall not include, with regard to any public 
institution of higher education, the following information which is 
deemed to be privileged and confidential:  
[P]edagogical, scholarly and/or academic research records and/or the 
specific details of any research project conducted under the auspices of 
a public higher education institution in New Jersey, including, but not 
limited to research, development information, testing procedures, or 
information regarding test participants, related to the development or 
testing of any pharmaceutical or pharmaceutical delivery system, 
except that a custodian may not deny inspection of a government 
record or part thereof that gives the name, title, expenditures, source 
and amounts of funding and date when the final project summary of 
any research will be available . . . .79
¶40 OPRA case law is not very developed because the New Jersey 
Government Records Council adjudicates most disputes administratively.  
From the few available administrative decisions concerning these 
exemptions, it is clear that non-disclosure of trade secrets is the norm.  For 
instance, in the one reported decision utilizing the academic research 
exemption, the Council held that Rutgers University did not have to 
disclose copies of responses to a questionnaire conducted as part of a crop 
damage survey.80  The mere fact that the research was “conducted under the 
                                                     
77 Id. § 47:1A-1.1. 
78 Id. § 47:1A-1.2(b). 
79 Id. § 47:1A-1.1. 
80 Rosenbaum v. Rutgers Univ., G.R.C. Complaint No. 2002-91 (Jan. 23, 2004), 
available at http://www.nj.gov/grc/decisions/2002-91.html. 
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auspices of a public higher education institution in New Jersey” was 
sufficient to support non-disclosure.81   
¶41 Both the language of the exemptions and the administrative 
decisions interpreting them show that New Jersey is much more protective 
of confidential research information than California.  Whereas California’s 
courts are required to constantly balance the public’s interest in disclosure 
versus nondisclosure, New Jersey courts only weigh the public interest in 
disclosure when parties try to circumvent OPRA by asserting the common 
law right to access public records.82  Unlike in California, this balancing 
test weighs against disclosure when there is a “legitimate private interest” in 
confidentiality.83  Much of the statutory protection of confidential 
information, particularly the biotechnology exemption, appears to be part of 
a concerted effort by New Jersey policymakers to make the state a favorable 
place for biotechnology companies to operate.84  In contrast, CPRA 
provides strong disincentives for companies to do business with California’s 
pubic research universities. 
CONCLUSION 
¶42 Compared to its federal and state counterparts, CPRA is weak when 
it comes to protecting confidential and proprietary information.  There are 
no hard exemptions for confidential corporate information, biotechnology 
or academic research, and even information that is nominally protected  
may be disclosed upon a showing that there is a public interest in disclosure.  
The resulting uncertainty provides a potentially significant disincentive for 
bioscience firms to partner with California’s public research universities 
because CPRA trumps the ability of the parties to properly balance by 
contract the university’s need to release information with the sponsor’s need 
to keep certain information secret, at least until a patent application is filed 
in appropriate cases.   
                                                     
81 Id.  See also Renna v. County of Union, G.R.C. Complaint No. 2003-100 
(Mar. 8, 2003), available at http://www.nj.gov/grc/decisions/2003-100.html 
(holding that county properly withheld Xerox’s proposal to provide copying 
services because it contained proprietary information and disclosure would have 
given and unfair advantage to competitors).   
82 See, e.g., Bergen County Improv. Auth. v. N. Jersey Media Group, Inc., 851 
A.2d 731, 742 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004) (finding a public interest in 
disclosure of audited financial statements of public hospital’s management 
services providers). 
83 Keddie v. Rutgers Univ., 689 A.2d 702, 710 (N.J. 1997).  Cf. San Gabriel 
Tribune v. Superior Court, 192 Cal. Rptr. 415, 424 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (stating 
that the public interest does not serve “the privacy interests of a private 
contractor”). 
84 See Riley, supra note 56. 
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¶43 Admittedly, no empirical research has been conducted to show how 
much sponsored research is actually deterred by CPRA-related concerns.  
Indeed, California’s public universities currently participate in many 
sponsored research projects despite the possibility of disclosure.  However, 
this may be largely because the gaps in CPRA and potential consequences 
are not widely known and no court has ruled on how CPRA’s exemptions 
apply to SRAs.  Just as private equity firms fled from California’s public 
pension funds following one adverse ruling requiring disclosure of 
confidential corporate information, California’s public research universities 
may be one adverse ruling away from losing substantial sponsored research 
funding.   
¶44 Accordingly, CPRA should be proactively amended to adequately 
protect the confidential intellectual property of bioscience firms who work 
with California’s public universities.  An excellent model is provided in the 
California Stem Cell Research and Cures Bond Act of 2004,85 enacted as 
part of Proposition 71, which dedicated $3 billion over 10 years to stem cell 
research.  The statute protects confidential information provided by 
researchers to the California Institute for Regenerative Medicine in 
connection with grant applications by exempting from disclosure under 
CPRA: 
Records containing or reflecting confidential intellectual property or 
work product, whether patentable or not, including, but not limited to, 
any formula, plan, pattern, process, tool, mechanism, compound, 
procedure, production data, or compilation of information, which is 
not patented, which is known only to certain individuals who are using 
it to fabricate, produce, or compound an article of trade or a service 
having commercial value and which gives its user an opportunity to 
obtain a business advantage over competitors who do not know it or 
use it.86
¶45 This exemption was included so that stem cell researchers would 
not be discouraged from seeking funding for these important projects.  A 
similar exemption should be added to CPRA generally.  Otherwise, many 
public/private collaborations in California that could lead to the 
development of useful pharmaceutical and other biotechnology products 
may continue to be needlessly deterred.  
                                                     
85 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 125291.10 - 125291.85 (Deering 2005). 
86 Id. § 125290.30(e)(2)(B). 
